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EXPLORING THE LATITUDE OF LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA
COASTAL COUNCIL: LOCAL CONTROL OF SURFACE MINING
JONATHAN BELCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
[Tjhere are many arts and sciences of which a miner
should not be ignorant . . . Lastly, there is the Law,
especially that dealing with metals, that he may claim his
own rights, that he may undertake the duty of giving others
his opinion on legal matters, that he may not take another
man's property and so make trouble for himself, and that
he may fulfill his obligation to others according to the
law.!
Georgius Agricola, an early mineralogist, wrote these words nearly
four hundred and fifty years ago in a time when mining as an industry was
in its embryonic stages. Indeed, Agricola himself has been credited with
devising many of the principles upon which the industry grew and
flourished It is, however, Agricola's statement that miners must be
intimately acquainted with the law and must not interfere with the use
rights of their neighbors that is most striking. The recognition, at such an
early era, of a necessary balance between the mining industry's economic
goals and the community's safety, health and property use rights is
interesting. In this statement, Agricola encapsulated the inherent tensions
between mineral development and the health and safety of the general
public.
These tensions are especially present in the surface or "strip"
mining of coal. Although surface mining may in many cases be the most
economical and efficient means of extracting coal, the process
* B.B.A. Morehead State University, 1990; J.D. Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College
of William & Mary, 1993.
1. GEORGIUS AGRICOLA, DE RE METALLICA 4 (Herbert C. Hoover and Lou H. Hoover
eds., Dover Publications 1950) (1556).
2. WILL DURANT, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION FROM
WYCLIF TO CALVIN: 1300-1564 753 (1957).
3. Id.
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unfortunately has the potential for causing great environmental damage.
For many years, surface mining was regulated exclusively at the state and
local levels.' However, by the 1970s it became apparent that state and
local regulations, even if they existed in a given jurisdiction, were not
stringent enough to deal with the problems of surface mining. Substantial
acres of land were strip mined and then left in unrestored or unreclaimed
conditions, causing social and economic damage to nearby areas and a
general decline in environmental quality.6 For these reasons, Congress
enacted the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA).7
The enactment of SMCRA has raised the question of what effect
should be given to local land use ordinances that regulate and control the
location of surface mining operations. In certain situations, local
regulation may be desirable, either because SMCRA is inapplicable,S or
because more stringent regulation is necessary to deal with uniquely local
problems.9 Once it is determined that local governments have the
authority to enact such ordinances, the next question that must be answered
is how far can such ordinances go in regulating surface mining in light of
the restrictions placed upon land use regulation by Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council'° and other Supreme Court decisions."
This article discusses the power of local governments to enact
ordinances dealing with surface mining. Specific attention is given to
SMCRA and whether that act preempts local regulation, particularly in the
states of Kentucky and Virginia. After the determination is made that a
4. Leslie E. Renkey, Local Zoning of Strip Mining, 57 KY. L.J. 738, 738-39 (1969).
5. M. Deborah Benoit, Note, Strip Mining: Methods of Control by the Three Levels of
Government, 8 URB. L. ANN. 143, 147 (1974).
6. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (1988).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 to 1328
(1988)).
8. SMCRA expressly applies only to the surface mining of coal. See 30 U.S.C. §
1202(a) (1988).
9. See, e.g. Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 597 A.2d 219 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1991) (upholding zoning ordinance that prohibited surface mining operation because
of hazardous effects on a contiguous residential subdivision), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 861
(Pa. 1992).
10. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
11. See, e.g., Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377 (N.J.
1992) (upholding licensing ordinance that imposed severe restrictions upon quarrying
operation and applying Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992),
to local ordinances that regulate mining).
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local government is not always preempted from such regulation, the article
focuses on whether ordinances prohibiting or restricting surface mining are
"takings" under the United States and state constitutions. Finally, it
concludes by stat.ng that these ordinances generally are valid, provided
they are narrowly tailored and contain variance or special exception
provisions to avoid possible "takings" challenges.
II. THE ABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO REGULATE: THE
PREEMPTION ISSUE
Surface mining is the process of removing the soil, rocks, and other
material called "overburden" covering a deposit of coal in order to extract
the coal.'2  Although surface mining is far more efficient than
underground mining," surface mining also has its drawbacks. In addition
to adversely affecting water quality,' surface mining also may cause air
pollution,' 5 noise pollution, 6 and aesthetic damages1 7 to the land. The
12. JAMEs M. MCELFISH, JR. AND ANN E. BEIER, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
COAL MINING: SMCRA's SECOND DECADE 14-15 (1990).
13. Surface mining produces a 90-95% recovery rate from a seam of coal, as opposed
to underground mining which provides only a 40-45% recovery rate. Benoit, supra note
5, at 144. Where underground or "deep" mining is used, coal pillars must be left in place
to support the shafts and overlying rock strata; no such pillars are necessary when surface
mining, resulting in increased efficiency. Id. Surface mining also is safer than
underground mining because elaborate ventilation systems and vertical supports are not
needed. Id.
14. MCELFISH AND BEIER, supra note 12, at 17. Surface mining affects water quality
primarily in two ways. First, when mined coal is exposed to air, the sulfur present in the
coal combines with air to form sulfuric acid. After heavy rains, these acidic solutions
seep from the mine site into nearby streams and rivers, contaminating drinking water
supplies and killing fish. Id. Second, surface mining may disrupt water-bearing rock
strata, altering the flow patterns of underground and surface water. Id.
15. See Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 597 A.2d 219,225 (Pa. Commw.
CL 1991) (noting that surface mining causes air pollution by releasing dust and other fine
particles into the air that filter into valleys below, causing respiratory distress), appeal
denied, 602 A.2d 861 (Pa. 1992).
16. 597 A.2d at 225. Vibrations and tremors are created when blasting is used to remove
overburden. In certain cases, these vibrations may damage the structural integrity of
nearby structures such as dams or houses. Id. The use of heavy equipment like shovels,
bulldozers, trucks and loaders may cause substantial increases in noise levels and impair
the quiet and solitude of adjacent residential communities.
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efficiency and economic advantages of surface mining must be balanced
against these negative consequences.
Whether a local government has the legal authority to regulate
surface mining depends on two factors. First, has the local government
been authorized by enabling legislation to regulate surface mining?
Second, who owns the surface of the land over the coal being regulated?
The first question will be examined in a later section.'" Regarding the
latter question, if a local government seeks to regulate the surface mining
of coal, it must determine initially if it is preempted from doing so by
SMCRA. If the coal sought to be regulated is underneath federally owned
land, a different preemption analysis also applies because SMCRA and
other federal statutes vest the federal government with authority over the
regulation of federal coal lands. 9 If the local government is regulating
a mineral other than coal, the locality must determine if there are any other
preempting federal or state statutes. This article primarily will be limited
to local regulation of coal surface mining.
A. Local Regulation of Privately Owned Coal Lands
Prior to regulating surface mining of coal on privately owned lands,
local governments must determine if they are preempted from doing so by
SMCRA.20 Implementation of SMCRA is a coordinated effort between
the federal and state governments, so this is primarily a question of
federal/state/local preemption." As discussed in a later section, if local
17. Prior to the enactment of SMCRA, in certain extreme cases, miners left the land
ravaged with rubble and deep chasms bearing little or no vegetation. Benoit, supra note
5, at 146. In one fascinating early case, gold miners in the 1850's used high pressure
hoses to wash down entire mountainsides in the Sierra Nevada mountain range to get at
gold deposits buried deep within them. Such "hydraulic mining" had the effect, however,
of flooding distant towns and valleys adjacent to the Yuba River which carries water from
the Sierra Nevada mountains. Eventually the practice was halted as a common law public
nuisance. See Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753 (C.C. Cal.
1884).
18. See infra notes 144 to 149 and accompanying text (discussing authorization through
state enabling legislation).
19. See 30 U.S.C. § 1291(5) (1988).
20. Laura A. Lane, Comment, Local Land Use Policies in the Reclamation of Strip
Mined Land, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 595, 596 (1980).
21. ARDEN H. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 31.03(13) (Edward H.
Ziegler, Jr. ed., 1991).
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governments want to regulate mining on federal lands, they need to
consider federal/local preemption.2
Congress enacted SMCRA in 1977 after finding that although
surface mining of coal is a significant contributor to our nation's economy
and energy supply, many surface mining operations cause extreme
environmental damages.' Specifically, Congress found that
many surface mining operations result in disturbances of
surface areas that burden and adversely effect commerce
and the public welfare by destroying or diminishing the
utility of the land for commercial, industrial, residential,
recreational, agricultural, and forestry purposes, by causing
erosion and landslides, by contributing to floods, by
polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats,
by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the property of
citizens, by creating hazards dangerous to life and property,
by degrading the quality of life in local communities, and
by counteracting governmental programs and efforts to
conserve soil, water, and other natural resources.
24
For these reasons, Congress established a nationwide program to protect
citizens and the environment from the harmful effects of surface mining,
and to encourage efficient and ecologically sound surface mining
methods.25
SMCRA differs from other federal environmental statutes by
delegating the ultimate authority for regulation to the states.8 By
establishing minimum standards states could follow in drafting their own
surface mining statutes, SMCRA sought to strike a coordinated balance
between federal, state and local interests.' SMCRA's framework has
two major components. First, an abandoned mine program was created to
reclaim and restore lands mined prior to the enactment of the Act. 8
Second, a regulatory and permitting program was set up requiring surface
22. See infra notes 87 to 134 and accompanying text (discussing regulation of surface
mining on federal lands).
23. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988).
24. Id. § 1201(c).
25. See id. § 1202(a), (f).
26. Id. § 1201(f.
27. Lane, supra note 20, at 600-01.
28. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-43 (1988).
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mine operators to comply with detailed reclamation and environmental
performance standards.29
To obtain jurisdiction to implement SMCRA's regulatory and
permitting program, a state must submit a plan to the Secretary of the
Interior demonstrating performance standards, sanctions and a permitting
process at least as stringent as SMCRA's minimum requirements? The
state's plan also must demonstrate sufficient funding and personnel to meet
the minimum requirements of the Act." Upon the Secretary's approval
of the state's plan, the state obtains a status known as "primacy."32 After
achieving primacy, the state gains exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation
of surface mining, with the exception that federal oversight and
enforcement is retained to ensure the state is satisfying the minimum
requirements." In the event that any state fails to submit a plan, the
Secretary must prepare, implement and enforce a plan for the state.' It
remains possible, however, for a state to achieve "primacy" even after a
federal plan has been implemented.35
The regulatory scheme under SMCRA consists of three parts: a
permitting process,36 environmental protection performance standards,"
and detailed inspection and enforcement provisions. 38  Prior to surface
mining on any tract of land, a coal operator must apply for and obtain a
surface mining permit from the appropriate federal or state agency.
39 If
the state has attained primacy, then the operator must apply with the state's
mining agency. If primacy has not been achieved, the permit is obtained
from the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
(OSMRE), which is within the Department of the Interior. In reviewing
the permit application, OSMRE or the equivalent state agency, considers,
among other things, the sufficiency of the applicant's reclamation plan, the
probable effect on water quantity and quality, and whether the proposed
29. See id. §§ 1251-79.
30. Id. § 1253.
31. Id. § 1253(a)(3).
32. McELFIsII AND BEIER, supra note 12, at 21.
33. Id.
34. 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988).
35. Id. § 1254(e).
36. Id. § 1256.
37. Id. § 1265.
38. See id. § 1267.
39. Id. § 1256(a).
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mine site is within an area designated as unsuitable for surface mining. 0
Once a permit is granted it remains in effect for five years, subject to
renewal."'
SMCRA requires extensive environmental protection performance
standards in federal and state plans.4 2 The performance standards seek
to return the land to its pre-mining condition to the extent possible. 
3
This goal is achieved through detailed rules requiring the reclamation of
soil and vegetation so that the land is returned to its approximate original
contour." The performance standards also seek to restore the land to a
condition capable of supporting pre-mining uses, or better uses if
possible. 5 Most of the standards relate to the content and placement of
topsoil, overburden, mine wastes, water impoundments and vegetation.
As a final condition, SMCRA requires an elaborate inspection and
monitoring system." Mine sites must be inspected for compliance with
applicable federal or state performance standards ai least once every
month, with a quarterly comprehensive inspection.47 Civil and criminal
penalties, as well as citizens' suits, ensure that surface mine operators
follow SMCRA's mandates."
Surprisingly, there has been little discussion of whether the federal
SMCRA or its state law counterparts preempt local governments from
regulating or prohibiting surface mining through land use regulations. The
authority that does exist on this issue indicates that localities are not
preempted from enacting such ordinances in every case.49
40. Id. § 1260(b).
41. Id. § 1256(b).
42. See id. § 1265.
43. Id. § 1265(b)(2).
44. Id. § 1265(b)(3). In certain cases, coal operators may receive a variance from the
approximate original contour requirement. See id. § 1265(c) and (e). The most typical
case where return to contour is not required is when the mountaintop removal mining
method is used. The mountaintop removal method is a large-scale operation in which all
of the overburden overlying an entire coal seam is removed by heavy equipment and
blasting. The entire top of the mountain is literally removed and deposited into valleys
or hollows near the mining operation. MCELFISH AND BEIER, supra note 12, at 15. In
such a situation, the surface miner is allowed to leave the land in a level plateau or gently
rolling contour. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(c)(2) (1988).
45. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2) (1988).
46. See id. § 1267.
47. Id. § 1267(c).
48. See id. § 1268.
49. Lane, supra note 20, at 598-601, 604-19.
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1. Preemption By Federal SMCRA
Federal statutes may preempt state or local laws in several ways.
First, Congress may preempt state or local law by express statement.50
Second, Congress may imply an intent to occupy a field in a given area,5
or to preempt state law only to the extent it actually conflicts with federal
law.52 SMCRA's preemption sections expressly provide that state and
local regulations are preempted only insofar as they "interfere with the
achievement of the purposes and the requirements" 3  and are
"inconsistent" with the Act.5" SMCRA states that
[any provision of any State law or regulation in effect
upon August 3, 1977, or which may become effective
thereafter, which provides for more stringent land use and
environmental controls and regulations of surface coal
mining and reclamation operation than do the provisions of
this chapter or any regulation issued pursuant thereto shall
not be construed to be inconsistent with this chapter.55
Therefore, while state and local land use and environmental laws that are
less restrictive than SMCRA are preempted, laws more restrictive than
50. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
51. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
52. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 204 (1982).
53. 30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (1988). When a federal program has been implemented in a
state
any statutes or regulations of such State which are in effect to regulate
surface mining and reclamation operations subject to this chapter shall,
insofar as they interfere with the achievement of the purposes and the
requirements of this chapter and the Federal program, be preempted and
superseded by the Federal program. The Secretary shall set forth any
State law or regulation which is preempted and superseded by the
Federal program.
Id.
54. Id. § 1255(a).
55. Id. § 1255(b) (emphasis added).
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SMCRA are not.'
Taken as a whole, the federal SMCRA clearly leaves room for local
land use regulation of surface mining." For instance, in developing
performance standards for mine site reclamation, SMCRA expressly states
that the post-mining land use must not be inconsistent with "applicable
land use policies and plans" or violate "Federal, State, or local law."58
Also, under the variance provisions, local land use planning agencies must
be consulted before granting a variance from the approximate original
contour requirement. 9  Such a variance is permissible only if the
proposed post-mining use is "consistent with adjacent land uses, and
existing State and local land use plans and programs."'' Localities may
be preempted from controlling the actual conduct of surface mining
operations, but it is clear they have the power "to determine, in
conjunction with applicable land use plans of the area, the permanent use
of the mined land once the mining operations have ceased." 61
If local governments have the power to control post-mining land
uses, then, as a logical antecedent, they also must have the power to
control the initial location of the mining.62 Local governments should
have this power for several reasons. First, land use regulations that control
the initial location of surface mining are not inconsistent with the federal
SMCRA. SMCRA declares that "existing State or local land use plans or
programs" must be consulted in determining which areas should be deemed
unsuitable for mining, indicating that local zoning should be followed.63
Second, a land use ordinance is more stringent if it prohibits surface
mining in a location that would, in the absence of the ordinance, be a
permissible location under SMCRA. SMCRA states that more stringent
state or local regulations are not preempted.6 Third, there is no actual
conflict between land use ordinances and the federal SMCRA, because
SMCRA primarily is an environmental rather than a land use statute.
Finally, localities should retain the power to control where surface mining
occurs, because the placement of a surface mine in a particular location
56. Lane, supra note 20, at 600-01.
57. Id.
58. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2) (1988).
59. Id. §§ 1265(c)(3)(A), (e)(3)(A).
60. Id. § 1265(c)(3)(C)/
61. Lane, supra note 20, at 600 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 600 n.30.
63. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(A) (1988).
64. See id. § 1255(b).
1993]
174 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 17:165
requires a balancing of uniquely local interests. 65
To summarize, the federal SMCRA would not preempt a local
government from: (1) enacting an ordinance requiring reclamation
standards more stringent than SMCRA," (2) enacting an ordinance that
regulates the post-mining use of the property, 7 or (3) enacting an
ordinance that controls the initial location of surface mining.68 In fact,
the federal SMCRA seemingly allows a locality to pass any land use
ordinance regulating surface mining, so long as that ordinance does not
actually conflict with or is more stringent than the federal statute.'9
2. Preemption By State SMCRA
Although the federal SMCRA does not always preempt local
regulation of surface mining, localities must determine if they are
preempted under a state surface mining act."0 A state may preempt local
regulation either expressly in its SMCRA or by implied intent based upon
the act's provisions.7 Theoretically such state/local preemption is
possible, but in practice few states have opted to preempt local regulation
of surface mining. 2  Most state surface mining acts closely track the
language of the federal SMCRA, usually in order to achieve "primacy;" so
presumably, local regulations are permissible if there is no actual conflict
with the state surface mining act or if they are more stringent than the
state act.73 Such non-conflicting concurrent local regulation of surface
mining, especially restrictions on location, are generally not preempted. 4
65. Renkey, supra note 4, at 746-48.
66. Lane, supra note 20, at 600-01.
67. Id. at 600.
68. Id. at 600 n.30.
69. See 30 U.S.C. § 1255 (1988); Zoning Ordinance for Mining Operation, Off. Op. S.D.
Att'y Gen. No. 86-04 (Mar. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Opinion of the South Dakota Attorney
General].
70. Lane, supra note 20, at 601.
71. See RAThKOPF, supra note 21, at § 31.03113].
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also Frew Run Gravel v. Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 924 (N.Y. 1987) (holding
that local ordinances controlling location or imposing stricter reclamation standards than
the state are not preempted by state surface mining act).
74. Id.; see also C. & M. Sand & Gravel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 673 P.2d 1013
(Colo. App. 1983) (holding that state mining act did not preempt local land use
regulation); Beverly Bank v. Cook County, 510 N.E.2d 941 (I11. App. 1987) (holding state
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Only a few state surface mining statutes expressly preempt local
regulation of mining. For instance, Alabama's Surface Mining Act states
that local, municipal and county regulation of surface coal mining is
preempted. 75  Pennsylvania's SMCRA is unique by declaring that all
local ordinances regulating surface mining are preempted, except for
zoning ordinances.76 Judicial decisions accordingly have upheld the
ability of localities in Pennsylvania to enact only zoning regulations that
control surface mining of coal.77
' The vast majority of state SMCRAs resemble the language of the
federal SMCRA, with a few variations. The surface mining acts of
Kentucky and Virginia are good examples. 78 Local governments in both
Kentucky and Virginia are not preempted from implementing land use
ordinances controlling the location of surface mining activities. 7"
SMCRA vests concurrent jurisdiction to state and local governments over regulation of
sanitary landfill sites); Frew Run Gravel v. Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987) (holding
state Mined-Land Reclamation statute did not preempt town zoning ordinances); Lower
Mount Bethel Township v. Stabler Dev. Co., 509 A.2d 1332 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)
(ruling that state SMCRA did not preempt local zoning ordinances).
75. ALA. CODE § 9-16-106 (1991).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.17 (1991).
77. See Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 597 A.2d 219, 225-26 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 861 (Pa. 1992); McClimans v. Board of
Supervisors, 529 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Commw. CL 1987), affd, 597 A.2d 738 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991); Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown, 451 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Pa.
1982).
78. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350.010-.990 (Baldwin 1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 45.1-
226-270.7 (Michie 1989).
79. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.610(4) (Baldwin 1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-
252(A)(4) (Michie 1989); see also Lane, supra note 20, at 615-19 (discussing ability of
local governments to regulate surface mining). The Kentucky statute, which generally
tracks the language of the federal SMCRA, is unique by adding a specific provision
stating that
[d]eterminations of the unsuitability of land for surface coal mining
shall be integrated as closely as possible with present and future land
use planning and regulation processes at any appropriate level of
government, including but not limited to any valid exercise of authority
of a municipality or county, acting independently or jointly, pursuant to
[the state zoning enabling act].
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.610(4) (Baldwin 1982). This section provides clear authority
for Kentucky localities to control the location of surface mining through zoning. Carolyn
S. Bratt, Surface Mining in Kentucky, 71 Ky. LJ. 7, 21-22 (1982).
1993]
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Localities in Kentucky also may play a role in controlling post-mining use
of the land,'" although the authority for local governments in Virginia to
do so is less clear."'
The ability of a local government to regulate surface mining on
privately owned land therefore depends mainly on the text of its state
SMCRA. In states like Alabama and Pennsylvania, which have more
restrictive preemption provisions, municipalities have less power to
regulate. As in Kentucky and Virginia, however, most state surface
mining acts essentially follow the language of the federal Act and d6 not
expressly preempt local regulation. Thus, in most states, local
governments do not appear to be preempted from passing non-conflicting
land use regulations, particularly controlling location of coal surface
mining.82
If the state has not enacted a surface mining act, then the provisions
of the federal SMCRA control.8 3 There is no indication from the federal
SMCRA that local governments are preempted from controlling the initial
location of surface mining activities on privately owned land.' There
also is no indication local governments are precluded from regulating the
post-mining use of the land, so long as the local regulations are not
inconsistent with the federal standards.85 It is likely that local regulation
80. Lane, supra note 20, at 615-19; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.405 (Baldwin 1982).
Regarding the role of Kentucky localities in the reclamation process, one commentator
noted
[tihe Kentucky statute reflects a legislative judgment that the prevention
of the injurious effects of strip mining lies in the active co-operation of
administrative regulatory bodies and local interests. The aim of the
Kentucky legislation seems to reach beyond merely protecting the
interests of local municipalities in land use designations following
reclamation, as in Pennsylvania. Rather, it provides a viable role for
planning agencies to recognize the developmental potential inherent in
strip mine reclamation.
Lane, supra note 20, at 619 (emphasis in original).
81. The Virginia SMCRA does not refer to the role of local land use policies in
determining post-mining uses. The statute, does, however, incorporate the performance
standards of the federal SMCRA, which require coordination of post-mining uses with
local land use policies and programs. See 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (1988).
82. RATHKOPF, supra note 21, at § 31.03[13].
83. Opinion of the South Dakota Attorney General, supra note 69.
84. See supra notes 57 to 61 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 50 to 61 and accompanying text.
176
LOCAL CONTROL OF SURFACE MINING
of post-mining uses would not be deemed inconsistent if they were more
stringent than the federal regulations.8 6
B. Local Regulation of Federally Owned Coal Lands
Local government control of coal surface mining is more limited
on federally owned land than on privately or state owned coal land. This
is largely true because the Property Clause,7 combined with the
Supremacy Clause,8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the
sole authority over the use and development of federally owned lands,
even if those lands are within the boundaries of a local government. 9
The Property Clause is not as exclusive as it may seem on its face,
however, because the Supreme Court has interpreted it to allow application
of state and local laws to federal lands, if they do not actually conflict with
federal statutes or programs.'
Mining of fuel and nonfuel minerals on federal lands is founded on
the Mining Law of 18729' and the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.91 The
Mining Law of 1872, consistent with its goal of encouraging mineral
exploration on federal lands, states that "all valuable mineral deposits in
lands belonging to the United States . . . shall be free and open to
exploration and purchase."93 The purpose of the Mining Law, which was
enacted when the West was relatively undeveloped, was to encourage
86. See 30 U.S.C. § 1255(b) (1988).
87. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The congress shall have the power to dispose of, and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States ... ").
88. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof,... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.
89. Kenneth E. Barnhill and Dianne Sawaya-Barnes, The Role of Local Government in
Mineral Development, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 221, 235 (1983).
90. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976); see also State ex rel. Andrus v.
Click, 554 P.2d 969 (Idaho 1976) (ruling no actual conflict was posed by state mining
statute requiring operators of surface mines on federally owned lands to obtain a mining
permit from the state).
91. Brubaker, 652 P.2d at 1055. For a detailed discussion of the Mining Law and
mining on federal lands, see JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL
MOTION (1986).
92. 30 U.S.C. § 181-287 (1988).
93. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1988).
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prospectors .to go onto public lands, search for minerals, and upon
discovery file a claim for a mining patent." Although the Mining Law
originally applied to all minerals, its control over the disposition of "fuel"
minerals like coal and gas has since been superseded by the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920.' 5 Like the Mining Law, the Mineral Leasing Act
seeks to facilitate mining on federal lands;" it is also generally more
pervasive than the Mining Law.9
Because the Mining Law and the Mineral Leasing Act allow mining
on federal lands, these statutes nearly always preempt local ordinances that
seek to prohibit such mining.9" Where Congress authorizes a specific use
of federal lands, localities are not permitted to supplant Congress' decision
with their own land use plans.' Localities may not use zoning to control
the location of mining on federal lands, because that would require use
classifications prohibiting mining in certain areas -- a regulatory scheme
94. United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 1980).
95. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, § 1, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982)), cited in Pattie P. Swift, Note, Federal
Public Lands: The States' Authority to Regulate Activities on Federal Land -- California
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 19 N.M. L. REv. 771, 779 n.59 (1989).
Interestingly, however, the purpose section of the Mining Law of 1872 still indicates that
all minerals (including oil, gas, coal, oil shale and uranium) are subject to the Mining
Law's overall purpose of fostering and encouraging mining on federal lands. 30 U.S.C.
§ 21a (1988).
96. See 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988).
97. Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 1050, 1057 (Colo. 1982) (noting
that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 "is more pervasive than the federal scheme
embodied in the Mining Law of 1872.").
98. Barnhill and Sawaya-Bames, supra note 89, at 232; see also AMERICAN LAW OF
MINING § 174.04[2][b] (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. ed., 1992); California Coastal Comm'n
v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987) (holding that state and local land use laws are
preempted from application to federal lands); Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d
1080 (9th Cir. 1979), affd mem., 445 U.S. 947 (1980) (holding that county was
preempted by the Mineral Leasing Act from requiring a mining company to obtain a
drilling permit prior to drilling on federally owned lands); Brubaker, 652 P.2d 1050
(holding that the Mining Law of 1872 preempts zoning ordinances prohibiting core
drilling on federally owned lands).
99. Ventura County, 601 F.2d at 1084. In Ventura County, the county attempted to
require a federal oil and gas lessee to obtain a drilling permit from the county in
accordance with the county's zoning ordinance. Id. at 1082. The proposed drill site,
although geographically located within the county, was owned by the federal government.
Id. The lessee already had obtained several permits from the federal government. Id.
The Ninth Circuit held the county zoning requirement was preempted as attempting to
prohibit a use expressly allowed by federal statute. Id. at 1086.
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clearly preempted by the Mining Law of 1872,"0 the Mineral Leasing
Act,.. and possibly the federal SMCRA.'"
Although local governments are preempted from controlling where
coal surface mining occurs on federal lands, they are not always preempted
from reasonably regulating the surface mining process used on those
lands."0 3 First, a local government must determine if its SMCRA
preempts local regulation of surface mining. As discussed previously, this
is a case specific inquiry resolved by the actual language of that state's
SMCRA. °4 After a local government determines it has the power to
regulate surface mining under state law, it may regulate surface mining on
federal lands, so long as those regulations do not actually conflict with
other federal statutes, such as the federal SMCRA.'0 5
The federal SMCRA applies to federal lands, but authority for
100. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 587 (holding that Mining Law of 1872, combined with
other federal land use statutes, preempts application of state and local land use laws to
federally owned lands).
101. Ventura County, 601 F.2d at 1083-85 (holding that Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
preempts county zoning controls on mineral development on federally owned lands), aff d
mem., 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
102. Under the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, the Secretary of the
Interior is vested with sole authority for determining which federal lands are to be
classified as unsuitable for mining. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(b) (1988). Although consultation
with appropriate state and local agencies is required prior to classifying lands as
unsuitable, SMCRA expressly states that
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the
Secretary to delegate to the States his duty to approve mining plans on
Federal lands, to designate certain Federal lands as unsuitable for
surface coal mining pursuant to section 1272 of this tide, or to regulate
other activities taking place on Federal lands.
Id. § 1273(c).
103. Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 1050, 1059 (Colo. 1982) ("State
and local laws that merely impose reasonable conditions upon the use of federal lands
may be enforceable, particularly where they are directed to environmental protection
concerns."); see also Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905) (upholding
Montana statute that regulated mining claims on federal lands); State ex rel. Andrus v.
Click, 554 P.2d 969 (Idaho 1976) (upholding state permit requirement for mining on
federal land).
104. See supra notes 70 to 82 and accompanying text (discussing state/local preemption
of surface mining).
105. Opinion of the South Dakota Attorney General, supra note 69; Brubaker, 652 P.2d
at 1059.
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regulating surface mining on federal lands is vested with the Secretary of
the Interior."°  The Secretary has exclusive control over designing
programs for federal lands'07 and for initially determining what federal
lands are unsuitable for surface mining."' The Secretary must design
SMCRA programs for federally owned lands at least as stringent as federal
standards and any existing state SMCRA standards."°  The federal
preemption provision states, however, that more stringent state and local
standards are not preempted." ° This has led some commentators to
conclude that local governments are not preempted from enacting surface
mining regulations more stringent than the Secretary's federally owned
lands program, if the local regulations do not cause actual conflict."'
For instance, a zoning ordinance imposing more stringent
reclamation requirements on coal mining might be applied to federal
lands."' Such an ordinance would not be preempted unless it prohibited
a use allowed under federal law, or conflicted with federal law by
interfering with coal mining development or productivity" 3  However,
where federal lands are concerned, localities arguably are in a "catch 22"
situation: ordinances more stringent than the federal SMCRA may be
necessary to overcome SMCRA preemption,"'4 but overly stringent
ordinances may offend the Mineral Leasing Act which seeks to facilitate
106. See 30 U.S.C. § 1273 (1988).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 1272(b).
109. Id. § 1273(a).
110. Id. § 1255(b).
111. Lane, supra note 20, at 599:
SMCRA clearly preserves existing state laws which are more stringent
than federal reclamation guidelines, and provides that states may enter
into cooperative agreements with the federal government to control the
reclamation of federal land. Unless the state law is inconsistent with
the Act, Congress did not intend to supersede or prevent its application
to federal coal lands.
See also Opinion of the South Dakota Attorney General, supra note 69 (approving a
zoning ordinance that imposed reclamation standards on mining on federally owned
lands).
112. See Opinion of the South Dakota Attorney General, supra note 69.
113. AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 174.04[2][b] (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. ed., 1992).
114. See 30 U.S.C. § 1255(b) (1988).
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and control the location of coal mining on federal lands."' Ordinances
with federal lands applications therefore must be carefully drafted.
As a practical matter, local environmental regulations are more
easily sustained than ordinances classifying the use of federal lands." 6
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., the Supreme
Court ruled that the federal regulatory scheme controlling mining on
federal lands does not preempt state environmental regulations, but would
preempt state land use regulations."' The Court reasoned that the field
of federal land use planning is occupied by statutes like the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act and the National Forest Management Act." 9
The Court drew a distinction between state environmental laws, which are
not always preempted, and state land use laws, which are assumed to be
preempted. 20
115. See Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 1979) (striking
down county zoning ordinance as inconsistent with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920's
goal of authorizing mineral development on federal lands), affd mem., 445 U.S. 947
(1980).
116. Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 1050, 1059 (Colo. 1982).
117. 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
118. Id. at 585.
119. Id. at 585-89. In Granite Rock, the Granite Rock Company had received approval
from the National Forest Service to mine limestone in the Big Sur region of the Los
Padres National Forest. Id. at 576. The California Coastal Commission subsequently
informed the mining company that it also must obtain a state coastal development permit
because the mine site was within a coastal zone. Id. Granite Rock claimed the Coastal
Commission was preempted from requiring permits on federal land. The Supreme Court
held that the Coastal Commission's permit requirement was not preempted because neither
the Forest Service regulations nor federal land management statutes demonstrated a
legislative intent to preempt state laws designed to protect the environment. Id. at 593.
120. Id. at 585. There has been much scholarly discussion on the Court's decision in
Granite Rock. One commentator views the case as a potential cause of confusion:
After Granite Rock, state and local governments are forced to consider,
and consider cautiously, the applicability of their laws to federal lands.
And their task is one that can overwhelm if the regulation-prohibition
distinction and environmental-land use distinctions apply in such a way
that a law's validity differs site to site and user to user. This approach,
surely, burdens state and local governments unfairly. If for no other
reason, greater clarity is needed in fairness to nonfederal lawmakers.
Eric T. Freyfogle, Granite Rock: Institutional Competence and the State Role in Federal
Land Planning, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 475,491 (1988). However, other authors applauded
the Court's distinctions as more protective of environmental issues:
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Granite Rock's environmental/land use distinction applies to local
ordinances.' 2 ' Local environmental laws, such as a reclamation
ordinance, are not preempted because Congress has evidenced no intent to
exclude local governments "from regulating mining activities on federal
land so as to safeguard environmental values.' 2 2  However, local
governments can not impose land use ordinances upon federal lands. 23
This distinction may be difficult to implement.'2 Although an ordinance
may be labelled "environmental," in effect it really may be a land use
ordinance.' 2 If a purported "environmental" ordinance regulates mining
on federal lands to the extent that mineral production is halted, it is for all
practical purposes a land use ordinance impermissibly prohibiting mining
on federal lands. 6
The Supreme Court's willingness to rule that states may impose
environmental regulations on private developers on federally owned
lands signals the Court's greater awareness of environmental issues. In
previous days, the emphasis of the Court would have been to encourage
mining at any cost to the environment.
Megan B. Smith, Note, Environmental Restrictions or Land Use Regulation -- The
Supreme Court Draws a Distinction: California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,
23 U.S.F. L. REV. 123, 144 (1988).
121. Wendy 1. Silver, Local and Federal Regulation of Mining in a Wilderness Area, 18
CoLO. LAW. 1967 (Oct. 1989).
122. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227, 238
(Wyo. 1985) ("We have found no cases striking down state regulations on the ground that
Congress by enacting mining and environmental protection laws intended to occupy the
field of environmental regulation of mineral development on federal land." Id. at 236.).
123. Freyfogle, supra note 120, at 475-76, citing Granite Rock.
124. Id. at 480.
125. Carl D. Savely, Note, National Mineral Policy: A Critical Need for Public
Awareness (California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co.), 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 173,
192 (1988).
126. Id. It also is possible for an ordinance to have the effect of being both an
environmental and a land use ordinance, depending'upon the economic stability of the
mining operation to which it is applied:
A mining law that requires post-mining land reclamation can add great
cost to a mining operation. If the mining operation is highly profitable,
the rule operates as an environmental regulation, presumably
permissible. But if the mining operation is otherwise economically
marginal, the statute might halt the mining because of the excessive
cost, an effect that seems more like a prohibition.
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Local surface mining reclamation ordinances, if permitted by state
law, V are one example of environmental regulations that may be applied
to federal lands.'2 Other examples might include local ordinances
aimed at pollution control 2 9 or a local ordinance designed to guide
mineral development on federal lands through simple permitting
procedures. 30 Prior to drafting any ordinance, local governments should
decide that the ordinance will be merely a guide to federal mineral
development, not a prohibition on such development."' Local
governments may also need to consult other federal environmental statutes
such as the Clean Air Act' and the Clean Water Act" to minimize
the likelihood of federal preemption."M
III. THE EXTENT TO WHICH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN REGULATE:
THE TAKINGS ISSUE
The previous section determined that local governments are not
always preempted from enacting zoning and other ordinances which
regulate the surface mining of coal. This section discusses how far local
governments may go in regulating without running afoul of the "takings"
clauses of the Fifth3 ' and Fourteenth 3 ' Amendments of the United
Freyfogle, supra note 120, at 480-81.
127. See supra notes 70 to 86 and accompanying text (discussing state/local preemption
of local ordinances regulating surface mining) and infra notes 144 to 149 and
accompanying text (discussing enabling authorization for local ordinances).
128. Freyfogle, supra note 120, at 480-81. Such an ordinance would, of course, only be
permissible if it did not have the effect of prohibiting the mining of coal on federal lands.
Id.
129. Barnhill and Sawaya-Barnes, supra note 89, at 232. It is unlikely that the Clean Air
Act or the Clean Water Act would preempt such an ordinance, because those acts
expressly recognize the connection between pollution control and land use planning. Id.
130. See State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 554 P.2d 969 (Idaho 1976). The locality would,
however, probably be preempted from denying a permit under such a permitting program
because a permit denial is tantamount to a prohibition on mining. Bamhill and Sawaya-
Barnes, supra note 89, at 237-38.
131. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987).
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-642 (1988).
133. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
134. Opinion of the South Dakota Attorney General, supra note 69.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
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States Constitution and similar clauses of their own state constitutions.
Localities may regulate the surface mining of coal in several ways.
First, many localities have used zoning ordinances to prohibit mining
anywhere within the locality, or to restrict mining to certain zones.
137
Within the framework of zoning, local governments occasionally permit
surface mining by variance or conditionally through special use
permits. 13  For example, some ordinances disallow surface mining "as
of right," but conditionally permit it in certain zones, such as agricultural,
if the mineral developer successfully applies for and obtains a special use
permit from the local zoning board.
1 39
Outside of zoning, local governments regulate surface mining
through licensing ordinances, 4 °  ordinances requiring post-mining
reclamation of the land, 141 or more sophisticated "mineral ordinances"
that guide the surface mining process.4 2 When applied to coal mining,
these non-zoning ordinances are more susceptible to preemption problems
than traditional zoning ordinances, which merely control the location of
mining through use restrictions or prohibitions. 143  For the sake of
simplicity, and because they are the most commonly used method of local
control, most of the following discussion is limited to zoning ordinances.
A. Authority to Regulate Under Enabling Legislation
At the outset, a municipality must determine whether it is able to
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . .
137. Renkey, supra note 4, at 746-48.
138. Benoit, supra note 5, at 159-60.
139. See, e.g., Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 597 A.2d 219, 220 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991) (discussing township zoning ordinance that permitted surface mining
only by special exception in A-I agricultural districts), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 861 (Pa.
1992).
140. See, e.g., Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377,
1379 (NJ. 1992) (discussing quarry licensing ordinance).
141. Lane, supra note 20, at 601-28.
142. Benoit, supra note 5, at 160. These types of mineral ordinances are more likely to
be preempted than other types of ordinances, because of their potential overlap with state
surface mining statutes. Id.
143. Id. at 159-60.
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enact ordinances regulating surface mining.'" This is a separate issue
from the preemption question discussed previously. Although a locality
may not be preempted from regulating surface mining through land use
ordinances, it generally must be authorized by enabling legislation to enact
such ordinances. 4  Before a locality zones surface mining, it must
consult the state zoning enabling statute. All state zoning statutes are
patterned after the Standard Zoning Enabling Act,'" which courts
construe as implicitly authorizing zoning of natural resources. 4 Some
states, like Kentucky and Virginia, have modified the language of the
Standard Act to expressly authorize such regulation." Localities must
look to other enabling legislation when regulating the surface mining of
coal through ordinances other than zoning.149
B. General Principles of the Takings Clause
Zoning and other ordinances that regulate surface mining have been
challenged frequently as "takings" of private property without just
compensation, especially where they prohibit surface mining from
144. See Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa.
1967).
145. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.16 (2d ed. 1988). Most state
constitutions give municipalities, and sometimes counties, home rule powers which allow
them to legislate in certain areas without statutory authority. Id. at § 4.27. The power
to enact land use ordinances, including zoning, is usually within the home rule power.
Id. § 4.28. However, in most home rule states, localities still must follow the state zoning
statute because zoning is a mauer of both state and local concern. Id.
146. Id. at § 4.16. The Standard Zoning Enabling Act, which forms the basis for zoning
in the United States, was developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the mid-
1920's. It was quickly adopted in some form by most states. Id.
147. Exton Quarries, 228 A.2d at 177. The actual text of the Standard Act is silent as
to zoning of natural resources development. Id.
148. Ky. REV. STAT. § 100.203 (Baldwin 1992) ("The city or county may regulate...
the removal of natural resources .... ); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486 (Michie 1989)(Counties and municipalities may "regulate, restrict, permit, and determine ... [t]he
excavation or mining of soil or other natural resources."). Both of these states also
expressly authorize local governments to consider natural resources when preparing
comprehensive plans. See KY. REV. STAT. § 100.187(3) (Baldwin 1992); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-447 (Michie 1992).
149. See, e.g., Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377,
1380-81 (NJ. 1992) (discussing municipal authorization to enact quarry licensing
ordinance by state licensing enabling statute).
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occurring anywhere within the locality.15° Rather than challenging the
ordinance on its face, plaintiffs typically assert the ordinance is a taking
"as-applied" to their property."' For example, in East Fairfield Coal
Company v. Booth,'12 a coal company successfully challenged a zoning
ordinance prohibiting the strip mining of coal on its property or anywhere
else in the township.'53 Ordinances that restrict, but do not prohibit,
surface mining also have been heavily contested.'- In one such case,
a mining company challenged an ordinance allowing surface mining only
by special exception in one district, the A-1 agricultural zone.'55
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation;' 56 the Fourteenth Amendment applies this to the
150. See Annotation, Prohibiting or Regulating Removal or Exploitation of Oil and Gas,
Minerals, Soil, or Other Natural Products Within Municipal Limits, 10 A.L.R.3d 1226
(1992).
An ordinance absolutely prohibiting surface mining anywhere in the municipality
also raises exclusionary zoning problems. In some states, such as Pennsylvania and Ohio,
local governments may not totally exclude surface mining as a use. See East Fairfield
Coal Co. v. Booth, 143 N.E.2d 309, 311 (Ohio 1957); Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169, 179-82 (Pa. 1967) (holding that municipal ordinance
prohibiting rock quarrying was unconstitutionally exclusionary). However, a detailed
discussion of the exclusionary nature of these ordinances is beyond the scope of this
paper.
151. Generally, nearly all cases challenging zoning ordinances as takings allege the
ordinance is a taking "as-applied" to a particular existing or proposed mine site. This is
so because until the property owner is injured by enforcement of the ordinance against his
surface mine, all he can bring is a facial challenge contesting the very enactment of the
ordinance. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-95
(1987). A facial challenge asserts the ordinance is invalid under every set of facts. Id.
Property owners avoid facial challenges because they rarely are successful. Id. at 495.
Furthermore, a facial challenge against regulations restricting surface mining was rejected
by the Supreme Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA) against facial attack).
152. 143 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 1957).
153. Id. at 311-12.
154. See Annotation, supra note 150, at 1256-57.
155. Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 597 A.2d 219 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 861 (Pa. 1992).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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states.' Initially it was thought the Takings Clause only protected
against direct physical appropriations of private property by the
government," 8 but the Supreme Court came to realize that unduly
onerous government regulations can have the same effect as direct
appropriation.' s9 In the oft-quoted words of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'' The question of
whether an ordinance or regulation takes a private owner's property is
therefore one of degree -- is the regulation so harsh it works to deprive the
owner of his property?'
6 1
However, property rights have never been viewed as so absolute
that all regulation of private property is prohibited. 62 As the Supreme
Court stated recently in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
63
property owners expect their property to be regulated from time to time to
a certain degree for the common good.'" If government had to pay
compensation every time it regulated private property, then government
could hardly exist.' 65 Courts have used a variety of tests to determine
when a regulation crosses the line and becomes a taking." Many courts
apply a balancing test which weighs the harm suffered by the individual
property owner against the public purposes promoted by the land use
regulation.' 67 Other courts may use a harm/benefit theory that upholds
regulations preventing a harm, but invalidates regulations conferring a
benefit on the public. 6
In recent years, the Supreme Court and a growing number of state
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("IN]or shall any State deprive any person of... property
without due process of law .... ").
158. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551. (1870).
159. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1992) (holding that
unduly onerous government regulations may have the effect of physically appropriating
property).
160. Id. at 415.
161. Id. at 416.
162. Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 735,
748-64 (1985) (discussing the historical conception of property rights and the takings
clause).
163. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
164. Id. at 2899.
165. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
166. MANDELKER, supra note 145, at § 2.06.
167. Id. at § 2.11.
168. Id. at § 2.08.
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and federal courts have come to favor the two part test set forth in Agins
v. City of Tiburon.'" Under the Agins test, to establish a taking the
private property owner must show either that the zoning ordinance does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or that it denies the
owner all economically viable use of his land.' The Court has
emphasized, however, that this test is not a set formula, but rather is a case
specific, ad hoc factual inquiry.'"
Since Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,"' zoning has been viewed as
a preferred means of land use control and is entitled to a presumption of
validity. To prove an ordinance is unsupported by legitimate public
interests, the private owner generally must show the ordinance is not
related to the public's safety, health, morals or general welfare.'" The
ordinance must serve the public interests which it purports to promote.7 4
If the private owner succeeds in proving the ordinance is unrelated or
insufficiently related to the asserted public interests, then the ordinance is
a "taking" of his or her property. 5 On the other hand, if the ordinance
is supported by legitimate goals, and is reasonably calculated to achieve
those goals, it is a valid exercise of the police power.
76
Even if the government satisfies the first phase of the taking
inquiry by demonstrating legitimate state interests in support of the
ordinance, the ordinance may nevertheless be a "taking" if it denies the
private owner all economic use of his property.'" The Supreme Court
has held that to present such a case, the private owner must be left without
169. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
170. Id. at 260. The Supreme Court recently has applied the Agins test in whole or in
part in a variety of cases. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. CL 2886
(1992) (using second prong of Agins to strike down beachfront management regulations
as total deprivations of all viable use); Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992)
(citing Agins to show that petitioners had mounted a facial challenge); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (using Agins' two part test to strike down
mandatory dedication of public beach easement). Professor Mandelker notes that the
Court "adopted" the Agins test in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987). MANDELKER, supra note 145, at § 2.23.
171. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. For discussion of recent Supreme Court takings doctrine,
see generally Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988).
172. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
173. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 487-88.
174. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-37.
175. Id. at 841-42.
176. DeBenediclis, 480 U.S. at 487-88.
177. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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any economically productive use of his property, typically to the extent the
land must be left undeveloped.'78 The most recent of the Court's
decisions in this area is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.7 9
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In Lucas, a private real estate developer had purchased two
beachfront lots on the South Carolina barrier island of the Isle of
Palms.18 There were no restrictions on development rights when Lucas
purchased the lots. However, the state of South Carolina subsequently
imposed beachfront development restrictions on the lots pursuant to its
Beachfront Management Act.' A setback line was established on
Lucas' lots which effectively prevented him from constructing any
occupiable dwellings.' On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the
trial court that Lucas had been deprived of all economically viable use of
his property." The Court then held that regulations depriving the owner
178. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894-95 (1992).
179. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
180. Id. at 2889. Lucas purchased the lots, which were zoned single-family residential,
for $975,000. Id. Evidence showed that although the lots were capable of being built
upon (and indeed, homes existed on directly adjacent lots), the lots had been completely
underwater for a six year period between 1957 and 1963 and were occasionally flooded
by the ebb and flow of the tide. Id. at 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2889. Among the purposes enunciated by the state for the Beachfront
Management Act were the protection of life and property from beach erosion and wave
energy, promoting tourism, nurturing the habitats of numerous plants and animals, and
providing a natural environment for the physical and mental well-being of the state's
citizens. Id. at 2896 n.10.
182. Id. at 2890.
183. Id. at 2896. Justice Blackmun, who dissented, believed this finding of the trial court
to be erroneous. Blackmun stated:
Petitioner still can enjoy other attributes of ownership, such as the right
to exclude others, "one of the most essential sticks- in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property." Petitioner can
picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a movable
trailer. State courts have frequently recognized that land has economic
value where the only residual economic uses are recreation or camping.
Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). But see Vatalaro v. Department
of Envtl Regulation, 601 So.2d 1223, 1227 n.5 (Fla. App. 1992) (holding that "passive
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of all beneficial use of his land can be sustained only if the owner never
had the legal right to use the property for the proscribed use.'" To
determine if the owner had the right to put the property to such a use, in
this case the construction of dwellings, one must consult state nuisance and
property law.' The Court ruled:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may
resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the owner's estate. shows that the
proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with.8 6
Furthermore, the Court held, limitations on the owner's title cannot be
newly legislated, but must originate from relevant background principles
of the common law.'7 The Court remanded the case for a determination
of whether Lucas would have been permitted to develop his lots under
recreational uses" are insufficient residual uses to defeat a claim of total deprivation of
economic value); see also infra notes 264 to 291 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between investment backed expectations and residual uses).
184. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
185. Id. at 2901. The Court provided some guidelines for this inquiry:
The "total taking" inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as the
application of state nuisance law normally entails) analysis of, among
other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities,
.. the social value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to
the locality in question .... and the relative ease with which the alleged
harm can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the
government (or adjacent private landowners) alike .... The fact that
a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners
ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition (though
changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was
previously permissible no longer so[).] So also does the fact that other
landowners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use denied
to the claimant.
Id.
186. Id. at 2899.
187. Id. at 2900.
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state property and nuisance law. 8' Lucas could be prevented from
developing his lots only if the state could identify "background principles
of nuisance and property law that prohibit the use he now intends in the
circumstances in which the property is presently found."'8 9 The Court,
however, suggested a doubt that the common law would prohibit Lucas
from building houses."
Lucas particularly applies to ordinances restricting or prohibiting
surface mining because, although total takings cases are rare, they are
more common where minerals are involved."9 This is true because,
"'[flor practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine it
S... What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be
exercised with profit."!' Ordinances denying or severely limiting an
owner's right to mine her coal may have the effect of depriving her of all
economically viable use of the coal. 93 This does not mean, however,
that the right to mine coal may never be restricted.
C. Relationship to Legitimate Public Interests
In testing the validity of a zoning ordinance that prohibits or
restricts surface mining, courts should engage in the typical two phase
takings inquiry.'"4 First, the court should decide if the ordinance furthers
legitimate state interests by being substantially related to the safety, health,
morals or general welfare of the community. 9 ' Courts have repeatedly
upheld zoning ordinances prohibiting surface mining when related to
preserving safety, health and general welfare.'9 Such ordinances are
upheld even where the property owner suffers economic hardship or loss
188. Id. at 2901.
189. Id. at 2901-02.
190. Id. at 2901.
191. See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1176 n.9 (Fed. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
192. Pennsylvania Coal Co. 'v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (quoting
Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820 (Pa. 1917)).
193. Id. ("To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly
the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.").
194. McClimans v. Board of Supervisors, 529 A.2d 562, 568 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987),
affd on appeal after remand, 597 A.2d 738 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
195. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987)
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
1.96. Annotation, supra note 150, at 1250.
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of profits." The critical determination is whether the prohibition on
surface mining is reasonably calculated to deal with legitimate safety,
health and general welfare concerns.19" The consensus of the cases on
this issue suggests that a court will uphold a zoning ordinance if the
ordinance prohibits surface mining near populated or residential areas.' 99
However, if the ordinance bans surface mining in a relatively unpopulated
or rural area, where little possibility of danger exists, it is less likely to be
upheld.' °
Several cases illustrate the distinction between ordinances relating
to safety, health and welfare, and those held not to have such a
relationship. In G.M.P. Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors,"' a
197. Id. Note, however, that if the private property owner suffers a complete deprivation
of profits and economic use, then the second phase of the takings inquiry is triggered.
See infra notes 236 to 323 and accompanying teXt.
198. McClimans, 529 A.2d at 568.
199. See Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377 (N.J.
1992) (upholding ordinance prohibiting quarries that would pose dangers to the public
safety and environment); Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 597 A.2d 219
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (upholding denial of special exception for surface mine operation
that would create air, noise and water pollution affecting contiguous residential areas),
appeal denied, 602 A.2d 861 (Pa. 1992); G.M.P. Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 457
A.2d 989 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (sustaining zoning ordinance prohibiting surface mining
in areas where drinking water contamination and erosion were possible); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962) (ordinance prohibiting quarrying held
valid because of danger to nearby residential areas and schools); Consolidated Rock
Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342, 345 (Cal. 1962) (upholding zoning
ordinance prohibiting rock and gravel operations that would create appreciable quantities
of dust injurious to the public health), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); see also
Village of Spillertown v. Prewiu, 171 N.E.2d 582 (III. 1961) (ordinance banning strip
mining upheld in light of property owner's excavations of large trenches near homes on
village street).
200. See East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth, 143 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Ohio 1957) (striking
down zoning ordinance that prohibited coal surface mining on run-down farm land
adjacent to an existing surface coal mine); Midland Elec. Coal Corp. v. Knox County, 115
N.E.2d 275, 285 (Ill. 1953) (striking down zoning ordinance prohibiting surface mining
of coal in an agricultural area that posed no danger to the safety, health or general
welfare); see also Frelk v. County of Kendall, 357 N.E.2d 1325 (I11. 1976) (denial of
special exception to surface mine in agricultural area overturned as unrelated to safety,
health or welfare); Herman v. Village of Hillside, 155 N.E.2d 47 (IIn. 1959) (invalidating
zoning ordinance that prohibited expansion of a quarry which was adjacent to an existing
quarry); Ex pane Kelso, 82 P. 241 (Cal. 1905) (invalidating ordinance excluding rock
quarrying absent proof that such quarrying injured the public health, safety or welfare).
201. 457 A.2d 989 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
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Pennsylvania court upheld a zoning ordinance restricting surface mining
to an "S-3 Special Purpose Mining Area" because the ordinance was
related to legitimate concerns over the environment.' The court found
that allowing mining outside of the S-3 district would increase the erosion
of slopes and pose a substantial risk to a nearby reservoir.' Witnesses
also testified that blasting from the strip mine would damage an aquifer,
impair the natural recharge of the reservoir by creating water barriers, and
contaminate drinking water supplies by acid mine drainage.2 For these
reasons, the court held that the ordinance clearly was related to the valid
government interest of preserving the environment. 2 5
Similarly, in Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt,' a property owner
unsuccessfully challenged an ordinance forbidding surface mining
anywhere within the township.2°7 Arguing in defense of the ordinance,
the village presented evidence that Prewitt, the property owner, was
digging trenches seventeen feet deep in order to extract coal from
underneath his half-acre lot in the village.0" Not only had Prewitt
excavated within six feet of his neighbor's lot line, he also had left these
trenches uncovered and filled with water, knowing that small children lived
and played within thirty feet of the lot.2°9 In rejecting Prewitt's takings
claim, the court held that under such circumstances it was obvious the
ordinance was enacted to preserve the public health and safety, and Prewitt
acted in utter disregard of those concerns. 210
In contrast, other cases have invalidated ordinances prohibiting or
restricting surface mining if the proposed surface mine posed no dangers
to the public safety, health or welfare. In Midland Electric Coal Corp. v.
Knox County,211 the court held that a zoning ordinance banning surface
mining in every district within the county except for the "G" district was
an unconstitutional taking of property without relation to safety, health or
welfare. 2 Significant in the court's analysis was the fact that Midland




206. 171 N.E.2d 582 (111. 1961).
207. Id. at 583.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 583-84.
211. 115 N.E.2d 275 (I1. 1953).
212. Id. at 287.
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Electric Coal Corporation's mine site produced no air, noise or water
pollution, nor did it create any traffic hazards, noxious odors or bacteria,
or decrease the property values of surrounding homes and businesses.
Also important were the economic interests at stake: $25,000,000 in coal
(in 1953 dollars!) and 300 jobs.214 In light of the economic interests at
risk and the unobtrusiveness of the particular mine, the court concluded
that the ordinance was insufficiently related to public health, safety, morals
or general welfare. 15 The court commented: "The evidence and the
findings clearly demonstrate that the gain from the prohibition is negligible
while the hardship visited upon the plaintiff is great. The plaintiff's coal
is being confiscated without any compensation.,
'26
In a case with somewhat less economically compelling
circumstances, an Ohio court enjoined enforcement of a zoning ordinance
that prohibited surface mining. In Kane v. Kreiter,'17 the proposed
surface mine was on steep, hilly, run-down farm land with very few
residences in close proximity."' The area surrounding the land also had
been extensively strip mined over the years.219 The site was of little
value as agricultural property.22° The court held that, as applied to this
particular site, the ordinance was a taking of property without just
compensation. 22' The public interests were not served by excluding
mining at such a location because there were few adjacent owners who
would be adversely affected. 2
213. Id. at 281.
214. Id. at 278, 281. One commentator suggested Midland Electric was decided
primarily on economic values, rather than on a careful consideration of the public safety
and health concerns. See Renkey, supra note 4, at 750. This assertion probably contains
merit, given the plaintiff in Midland Elec. contributed over 20 percent of the county's
property tax revenues and was the county's only major industry. 115 N.E.2d at 281.
215. 115 N.E.2d at 287.
216. Id.
217. 195 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio 1963).




222. Id. Several other cases have held zoning ordinances prohibiting surface mining to
be unsupported by legitimate public interests. See East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth, 143
N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 1957) (holding that public interests were not protected by banning
surface mining on run-down farm land located at the edge of the township, over two miles
away from any developed areas and adjacent to an existing strip mine); Herman v. Village
of Hillside, 155 N.E.2d 47, 50, 53 (III. 1959) holding that financial interests justified
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In practice, cases striking down surface mining ordinances as
insufficiently related to safety, health or welfare have become less frequent
in recent decades.223  As courts become more conscious of the
environment and rural areas become more urbanized, striking down zoning
ordinances regulating surface mining will become the trend.2 u When a
court does closely scrutinize the public interests in support of the
ordinance, it considers the following factors to be important: the proximity
of the mine site to residential areas and schools, 22 the possibility of air,
water and noise pollution from the mine,22 the importance of the mine
to the community's economic and job base,2' aesthetics, 22' and the
hardship imposed upon the private owner desiring to surface mine.229
Activities regulated by extensive state and federal regulations
sometimes are shielded to a certain degree from exclusion by zoning.
2 0
The argument is that, because of heavy regulations, these activities will not
have as great an impact on the community. Proving that a ban on such
activities is necessary to preserve the public welfare, therefore, is
presumably more difficult. For example, in General Battery Corp. v.
Alsace Township,23' the court held that a zoning ordinance excluding
waste disposal facilities was unrelated to the public health, safety or
invalidating a rezoning which prohibited the plaintiff from expanding his limestone quarry
even though the quarry was now surrounded by single-family residences and businesses
that were inconvenienced by blasting, noise, vibrations and air pollution emanating from
the site); Ex parte Kelso, 82 P. 241 (Cal. 1905) (striking down an ordinance proscribing
quarrying, rather than regulating blasting, anywhere within the city and county of San
Francisco because the ordinance did not further legitimate police power interests).
223. Renkey, supra note 4, at 75 1.
224. Id. ("These cases were decided at a time when environmental concerns were
considered less important than economic factors, explaining the obvious absence of any
discussion of the former.").
225. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962); Village of Spillertown
v. Prewitt, 171 N.E.2d 582, 584 (III. 1961).
226. Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1384 (N.J.
1992); G.M.P. Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 457 A.2d 989, 995 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983).
227. Midland Elec. Coal Corp. v. Knox County, 115 N.E.2d 275, 281-82 (III. 1953).
228. Bernardsville Quarry, 608 A.2d at 1384; G.M.P. Land Co., 457 A.2d at 995.
229. Kane v. Kreiter, 195 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ohio 1963); Herman v. Village of Hillside,
155 N.E.2d 47, 52-53 (I11. 959); Midland Elec., 115 N.E.2d at 283.
230. See General Battery Corp. v. Alsace Township, 371 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1977) (invalidating ordinance that excluded a heavily regulated activity because the
activity therefore had little potential for harming the public safety, health or welfare).
231. 371 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
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welfare because those interests already were adequately protected by
extensive state regulations. 2 Similarly, the surface mining of coal is
subject to considerable regulation by federal and state SMCRAs and other
environmental statutes,233 but this argument essentially was made and
rejected in another Pennsylvania case, Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning
Hearing Board.2  In Amerikohl the court reasoned that regulation by a
state SMCRA does not foreclose a local zoning board from considering the
welfare of the citizens of a particular district.2
35
D. Effect of Total Deprivation of Economically Viable Uses
Once a municipality overcomes the first phase of the takings
inquiry by proving the zoning ordinance substantially furthers legitimate
state interests, the court then should decide if second phase inquiry is
triggered by the owner being deprived of all economically viable use of his
property.26 Judging whether a regulation proscribing the mining of coal
is one that deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property has
been especially problematic for the courts for two reasons. First, for all
practical purposes the ownership of coal consists of the right to mine the
coal.237 A regulation depriving the owner of the right to mine in effect
denies him ownership of the coal.238 Second, the degree of ownership
often is important. Frequently where minerals are involved, the mineral
or subsurface estate is split by conveyance from the surface estate.239 If
the property owner's total ownership consists only of the mineral estate,
then obviously a regulation obstructing the right to mine coal has an
entirely different effect on him from that on an individual who owns both
the surface and subsurface estates. Whether, for "takings" purposes, the
fee simple can be split into a subsurface mineral estate and a surface estate
232. Id. at 1032-33.
233. See supra notes 20 to 86 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state
regulation of coal surface mining).
234. 597 A.2d 219, 226 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 861 (Pa.
1992).
235. Id.
236. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987)
(quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
237. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
238. Id.
239. See id. at 412.
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has caused a division among courts.
1. Property Owner Owns Only the Subsurface
If only the mineral estate is owned, under the right facts, all courts
should hold that an ordinance prohibiting the right to mine is a "taking"
because it deprives the owner of all economic value of his property. °
The qualification "under the right facts" is important, because, as will be
discussed later, if the mining amounts to a nuisance, it may be banned."
The situation in which the owner's total interest consists of the mineral
estate, is exemplified by Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.A2 In Mahon,
the surface and subsurface estate was split; the Pennsylvania Coal
Company owned the minerals and the Mahons owned the surface."
When the state passed a statute effectively forbidding Pennsylvania Coal
from mining its mineral estate, the company brought a takings claim.'
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, agreed with the
plaintiff, holding that the statute had the same effect as appropriating or
destroying the mineral estate by making it commercially impossible to
mine.2'5 Because the mineral estate was all the coal company owned,
its destruction by regulation required payment of just compensation. 6
In most cases the deeds under which surface mining companies
hold title grant rights solely to minerals, with covenants licensing use of
the surface of the land only for mining." Hence, the restriction of the
right to mine coal creates the possibility of a situation similar to Mahon.
Because mining companies may have no-rights to use the surface for
anything other than mining, and because the subsurface has value only if
240. Id. at 414. Professor Michelman refers to this as "conceptual severance."
Michelman, supra note 171, at 1614-21.
241. See infra notes 302 to 323 and accompanying text (discussing the nuisance
exception).
242. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
243. id. at 412.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 414-15.
246. Id.
247. Benoit, supra note 5, at 151-53.
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mined, mining may be the only viable use." Where surface mining on
federally owned lands is restricted, such takings claims are common.2 9
All private surface mining on federal lands is done by individuals and
entities with claims only to the minerals, so an ordinance prohibiting
surface mining on federally owned land divests the private miner of the
use of his only property -- the minerals.'
2. Property Owner Owns Both Surface and Subsurface
A property owner holding title to both the surface and the
subsurface may seek to surface mine. Under these facts, courts are divided
on whether an ordinance or regulation banning the right to mine usurps
from the owner all economically viable use of the land. Major issues on
which courts are divided include the importance of the owner's investment
backed expectations, the feasibility of residual land uses, and whether
property can be split into separate estates for "takings" purposes. In
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,' s' the Supreme
Court laid out three factors to be considered in takings cases. z 2 One
was the extent to which the regulation interferes with the private owner's
reasonable, investment backed expectations. 3 Courts have reached
different interpretations as to the meaning and importance of reasonable,
investment backed expectations.-" When the Supreme Court uses the
248. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1557
(1985) (quoting 47 Fed. Reg. 25296-97 (1982) ("For owners of only coal rights, there is
not reasonable remaining use where surface coal mining operations cannot occur by any
technological means ....")).
249. Barnhill and Sawaya-Barnes, supra note 89, at 241.
250. Id.
251. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
252. Id. at 130-31.
253. d. The other two factors are the economic impact of the regulation and the
character of the government action. Id. The three factors specified by Penn Central
generally have been viewed by commentators as confusing and difficult to apply.
MANDELKER, supra note 145, at § 2.18. Apparently the current Supreme Court also
dislikes Penn Central's three factors, usually preferring to use the two part inquiry of
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), with occasional reference to Penn
Central. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles
Part ! -- A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL L. REv. 1299, 1327-29
(1989).
254. Peterson, supra note 253, at 1320.
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phrase, it typically is referring to whether the private property owner relied
to her detriment on an expectation that the government would not act as
it did.2" For instance, in Lucas, the Court reasoned that property
owners' investment backed expectations usually are founded upon the
bedrock of the common law of property and nuisance. "  Private
property owners may rely on the reasonable expectation that they can use
their property for any use permitted under the common law.2s7
Therefore, when a regulation goes beyond the common law, compensation
must be paid to the property owner who was injured by reliance on the
"historical compact" of the common law.2 5
Although surface mining traditionally has been viewed as a
legitimate business and is not a nuisance per se, enough cases have held
particular surface mines to be nuisances in fact that it is doubtful any such
"historical compact" exists.2s9 Nevertheless, some courts have held that
if the property owner purchased the property with the expectation he could
surface mine, a regulation depriving the owner of the right to mine is a
"itaking. '2W These courts seem to elevate interference with investment
backed expectations as the sole test for a taking." Other courts hold
255. Id.
256. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. CL 2886, 2900-01 (1992); id. at
2903 (Kennedy. J., concurring).
257. Id. at 2901
258. Id. at 2900-01. Justice Blackmun, who dissented, found himself in fundamental
disagreement concerning this "historical compact." "It is not clear from the Court's
opinion where our 'historical compact' or 'citizens' understanding' comes from, but it
does not appear to be history." Id. at 2914-17 (Blackmun. J., dissenting)
259. See irfra notes 310 to 323 and accompanying text (discussing surface mining as a
nuisance under the common law).
260. See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1174-76 (Fed. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991) (invalidating ban on mining in alluvial valley
floors as applied to property of coal company which invested over a million dollars in the
land with the pre-regulation expectation that it would be able to surface mine); McClimans
v. Board of Supervisors, 529 A.2d 562. 569-70 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), affd on appeal
after remand, 597 A.2d 738 (Pa. Commw. CL 1991) (invalidating zoning ordinance
prohibiting plaintiff from surface mining where plaintiff invested in the property
exclusively for mining purposes).
261. Cf. Vatalaro v. Dep't of Envir. Reg., 601 So.2d 1223, 1228 (Fla. App. 1992)
(holding that interference with investment backed expectations is the sole test for
determining a taking).
In his concurring opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice
Kennedy appeared to endorse investment backed expectations as the sole test for a taking:
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that, even though the owner may have expected to reap great profits by
mining, he is not deprived of all use of his property if he can put it to
other, albeit less profitable uses. 2
Courts also disagree on the feasibility or reasonableness of residual
uses of the land, and how investment backed expectations relate to those
residual uses. It is fundamental that if economically productive uses
remain, no taking exists. 3 However, just how "productive" must the
residual use be to defeat the takings claim, and to what degree is the
reasonableness of such uses subjectified by the intentions of the property
owner? After Lucas, it is possible that marginally productive residual uses
will not negate the takings claim, especially where the property owner is
ill-equipped for the residual use, or never expected to use the property in
such a manner.2' In Lucas, a complete taking was found even though
the owner could have used his property for less profitable uses such as a
camp or mobile home site.' 5
The following cases illustrate the different approaches courts take
regarding the reasonableness of post-regulation residual uses. In G.M.P.
Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors,' a Pennsylvania court upheld a
zoning ordinance restricting G.M.P. from surface mining because the
property could be used for other, alternative uses.267 The court stated:
GMP could develop, among other things, tree farming,
Where a taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the property
of all value, the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to
reasonable, investment-backed expectations .... The expectations
protected by the Constitution are based on objective rules and customs
that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved. In my
view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole
of our legal tradition.
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
262. Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bemardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1387 (N.J.
1992); G.M.P. Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 457 A.2d 989, 994 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983).
263. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
264. Even prior to Lucas, some commentators maintained that residual uses must be
economically "significant" before the takings claim can be rejected. Peterson, supra note
253, at 1331.
265. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
266. 457 A.2d 989 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
267. Id. at 994.
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hiking trails, resort hunting camps, a scenic overlook and
drive, and cross-country skiing and snowmobile trails.
Although those alternatives are potentially less profitable
than stripmining, their availability clearly demonstrates that
the township's [zoning] ordinance does not render GMP's
surface estate in the yellow area [where mining is
prohibited] valueless or useless. 268
A similar result was reached in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of
Los Angeles,' which upheld an ordinance that shut down a rock and
gravel quarry because the property remained useful for certain agriculture,
livestock raising, golf courses, and recreation. 7
Although the courts in G.M.P. Land Co. and Consolidated Rock
believed that basic agricultural and recreational residual uses were
sufficient to defeat a claim of total deprivation, other courts have directly
opposed this viewpoint. In Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States,27 the
plaintiff coal company succeeded in persuading the court that the SMCRA
took its minerals without payment of compensation by banning surface
mining in alluvial valley floors. 2 The court rejected the government's
argument that the company was not deprived of all economic use because
it could farm the land." Stating that the government's argument was
"'completely off the mark,"' the court emphasized the company had
purchased the property with the expectation it would be able to mine it,
and that SMCRA took the company's coal rights.' 4 As one early case
noted, "us[ing] the surface for farming purposes provides no use for the
mineral property beneath it.""
Likewise, the court in Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
268. Id.
269. 370 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
270. Id. at 351.
271. 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
272. Id. at 1174.
273. .d. The court also held that SMCRA's "coal exchange" provision, a sort of
transferable development right (TDR) for minerals, did not compensate the coal company
for the taking. Id. at 1176 ("To hold that mere presence of an exchange provision
precludes a court from finding a taking on enactment in cases like this one would
eviscerate the constitutional just compensation guarantee.").
274. Id. at 1174.
275. Midland Elec. Coal Corp. v. Knox County, 115 N.E.2d 275, 283 (I!1. 1953).
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Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,v cited approvingly by the Supreme
Court in Lucas, found the presence of marginal residual uses to be
unavailing.tm  In Morris County, the court held that the township's
zoning ordinance was a "taking" because it required the property owner to
leave his land substantially in its natural state.V7s The ordinance
prohibited the land company from continuing to mine sand and gravel
from the wetlands area, as well as just about any other significantly
productive use.7 9 The court noted, "All in all, about the only practical
use which can be made of property in the zone is a hunting or fishing
preserve or a wildlife sanctuary, none of which can be considered
productive."2" The test of whether a residual use is sufficient is
reasonableness and economic feasibility."' Under this ordinance, the
land company's residual use rights were hollow and could not defeat its
claim for just compensation.
The approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in Lucas -
- now the law of the land for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment takings
purposes -- regarding the reasonableness or feasibility of residual uses is
more like Whitney Benefits and Morris County; in fact, the Court expressly
adopted Morris County."3 In contrast, the views of Justice Blackmun,
who dissented in Lucas, bear a closer relationship to the reasoning of
G.M.P. Land Co. and Consolidated Rock.2" In Lucas, Justice Blackmun
maintained the plaintiff wasn't deprived of all beneficial use of his
property because he still could exclude others, picnic, swim, camp in a
tent, or live in a movable trailer on the lot.28 ' These are the same types
of residual uses cited by the courts in G.M.P. Land Co. and Consolidated
Rock to support their holdings that other economically viable uses
276. 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963).
277. Id. at 240.
278. Id. at 243.
279. Id. at 239-40.
280. Id. at 240.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 243. For another case rejecting passive recreational uses as sufficient to
negate a claim of total deprivation, see Vatalaro v. Dep't of Envir. Reg., 601 So.2d 1223
(Fla. App. 1992) (sustaining a claim of total deprivation even though plaintiff still could
use the land for passive recreational uses such as a boardwalk).
283. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894-95 and n.7 (1992).
284. See id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
285. Id.
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remained.' Yet the Lucas majority, like the courts in Whitney Benefits
and Morris County, denied that these types of marginally productive
residual uses will defeat a claim of total deprivation.W
Apparently the Supreme Court requires some sort of substantial
residual use before denying a claim of total deprivation of economically
viable uses.2 8 An example of this type of substantial residual use was
present in the recent case of Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of
Bernardsville,'9 which cited Lucas in rejecting a takings claim brought
against a municipal ordinance restricting rock quarrying.2' In
Bernardsville Quarry, the quarry owner still could use the property, quite
profitably, as a blacktop and concrete plant, as well as for a variety of
other commercial and residential uses.291  After Lucas, the Supreme
Court might require the same type of economically productive residual use.
There also is uncertainty among the courts on whether a property
owner can receive compensation for a taking of a separate, distinct estate
or interest in minerals, apart from the surface estate. 292 Although some
courts have interpreted Supreme Court decisions as holding that the
Takings Clause cannot be used to compensate for takings of fractional
286. See G.M.P. Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 457 A.2d 989,994 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342, 351 (Cal.
1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
287. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95. The majority opinion in Lucas does not say much
about Lucas' residual uses. Rather, the majority chose to adopt the trial court's finding
that there were no economically productive residual uses. Id. at 2890. It can be implied,
however, that the majority would require something more than a marginally productive
use by its citation of Morris County and its rejection of Justice Blackmun's position.
Indeed, even prior to Lucas, some commentators believed the court required more than
marginally productive residual uses. Peterson, supra note 253, at 1331 ("Thus, for a
claimant to establish a taking under the 'no economically viable use' test, he evidently
must show that the challenged law prevents landowners from obtaining any significant
economic benefit from owning their land.") (emphasis added).
288. Peterson, supra note 253, at 1331.
289. 608 A.2d 1377 (N.J. 1992).
290. Id. at 1387.
291. Id. at 1387.
292. Compare Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1174 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (holding property owner may be completely deprived of separate mineral estate,
requiring payment of compensation), cert. denied, 112 S. C. 406 (1991), with
Bernardsville Quarry, 608 A.2d at 1389 (holding plaintiff may not bring a takings claim
based upon deprivation of separate estate or interest in property).
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property interests like mineral estates,293 others have concluded that
mineral is an estate unto itself deserving Takings Clause protection in the
same degree as the fee simple absolute.2' Whitney Benefits is an
example of cases in the latter category. This confusion is manifested by
the majority's statement in Lucas that: "Regrettably, the rhetorical force of
our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its
precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against
which the loss of value is to be measured. 295
To resolve this confusion, Lucas holds (in a footnote) that if the
property interest allegedly taken is one recognized as a distinct property
interest under state law, then the Takings Clause protects that interest.
2
"
Therefore, if the property law in a particular state recognizes a separate
mineral or subsurface estate, then a regulation denying all use of that estate
can be challenged as a taking under federal law.29' By this holding,
Lucas essentially affirms Whitney Benefits and opens the door for claims
of total deprivations of separate, distinct property interests such as a
"mineral estate," at least to the extent such an interest is recognized by
state law.2
98
In his dissent in Lucas, Justice Stevens maintained the majority's
broad definition of property encourages property owners to manipulate
their property interests to take advantage of the Court's new rule.29
293. Bernardsville Quarry, 608 A.2d at 1389 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987)).
294. See Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1174, 1176.
295. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. CL 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
296. Id. In answering the question of whether takings of fractional interests in property
can be compensated, the Court noted:
The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's
reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property
-- i.e., accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest
in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution
in (or elimination of) value. In any event, we avoid this difficulty in
the present case, since the "interest in land" that Lucas has pleaded (a




298. Id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 2919-20.
204
LOCAL CONTROL OF SURFACE MINING
"The smaller the estate, the more likely that a regulatory change will effect
a total taking," noted Stevens.' ° If Justice Stevens is correct, mineral
developers anticipating prohibitions on surface mining may be able to
make out a prima facie case of total deprivation merely by acquiring only
the mineral estate.3 0' However, the inherent risks involved with takings
litigation and the presumption of validity attaching to zoning presumably
would deter developers from acquiring smaller estates just to take
advantage of the Court's takings jurisprudence.
3. The Nuisance Exception
Even if an ordinance does deprive a property owner of all
beneficial use of his property, a taking will not necessarily be found in
every case. If the proscribed use is one the owner had no legal right to
make in the first place, i.e. if it amounts to -a nuisance, then the
government is need not pay compensation:.3 This reasoning stems from
the common law maxim sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas, which means
that property may not be used in a manner injurious to the property of
another °.303 A zoning ordinance legitimately can circumscribe an activity
that amounts to a common law nuisance.' Before Lucas, it also was
300. Id. at 2919.
301. See id. at 2920 n.4:
In past decisions, we have stated that a regulation effects a taking if it
"denies an owner economically viable use of his land," ... indicating
that this "total takings" test did not apply to other estates. Today,
however, the Court suggests that a regulation may effect a total taking
of any real property interest. (emphasis in original).
Criticism of Whitney Benefits and other cases finding takings of the distinct mineral estate
relied on this land/property distinction which Justice Stevens, probably correctly, suggests
has been abrogated by Lucas. See Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville,
608 A.2d 1377, 1389 (NJ. 1992) (criticizing Whitney Benefits because only land can be
taken, not property). Thus, Lucas can be read as supporting total takings claims of
property interests other than land. Bernardsville Quarry, although decided after Lucas,
is incorrect to the extent it says otherwise.
302. Lucas, 112 S. CL at 2901; see also Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt, 171 N.E.2d
582, 584 (Il1. 1961) (upholding prohibition of surface mining constituting a nuisance to
the public and adjacent landowners).
303. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
304. MANDELKER, supra note 145, at § 4.16.
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thought "noxious" or "nuisance-like" activities, not amounting to public
nuisances, could be enjoined.) 5 Lucas narrowed the scope of the
nuisance exception by declaring that if a regulation denies all economically
productive use of land, the court will sustain it only if "background
principles of nuisance and property law" would proscribe the use.' 6 If
the use declared "off limits" by the ordinance or regulation could not have
been enjoined in a state common law public or private nuisance action,
then the owner must receive just compensation.'
Under Lucas, if a zoning ordinance forbidding surface mining has
the effect of depriving the owner of all beneficial use of his land, the
owner must receive compensation unless the proposed surface mine would
amount to a common law nuisance under state law." 8 This inquiry
necessarily must be case specific. °9 Although in certain cases surface
mining has been held to constitute a common law nuisance, surface mining
is a legitimate business and has never been viewed as a nuisance per
305. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2910-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-93 (1987) (maintaining that
nuisance-like activities may be abated by the police power).
306. Lucas, 112 S. CL at 2901-02. Three of the justices disapproved of the Court's
narrowing of the nuisance exception. Justice Kennedy, although he concurred in the
judgment, was troubled because only common law, not legislatively declared, nuisances
now come under the exception. Id. at 2903-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Maintaining the majority's reading of precedent was "distorted," Justice
Blackmun noted that the use of nuisance law as a standard could be problematic:
There is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead. They
determined a harm in the same way as state judges and legislatures do
today. If judges in the 18th and 19th centuries can distinguish a harm
from a benefit, why not judges in the 20th century, and if judges can,
why not legislators? There is simply no reason to believe that new
interpretations of the hoary common law nuisance doctrine will be
particularly "objective" or "value-free."
Id. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens voiced similar concerns in his
dissent, arguing the majority was departing from precedent. Id. at 2920-22 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
307. Id. at 2901.
308. See id. at 2900.
309. See id. at 2901-02.
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se.310 It is well established that
Mining is a lawful and necessary business and a reasonable
use of property, and neither mining nor quarrying is a
nuisance per se, even though carried on in a populous
community. So long as the business is conducted in the
ordinary way and with the usual and customary precautions,
the operator is not accountable for incidental annoyances to
others that necessarily follow the mining operations. This
is true of coal mining as well as other mining. Of course,
mining, like any other business, may become a nuisance by
reason of the manner in which it is carried on.31 t
A particular surface mining operation can, however, be a common law
nuisance if excessive smoke, fumes or dust are produced, or if noise and
vibrations from equipment or blasting disturb the peace. Other factors
used to determine if mining is a nuisance are the potential for water
pollution, erosion, landslides, and the release of noxious gases.
Surface mining also may be a nuisance if it poses substantial safety risk,




The fact that a surface mine was once in a rural area, but is now
surrounded by residential and commercial development, is another factor
to consider.31 5 However, if the mine was a nonconforming use when the
zoning ordinance was enacted, a court cannot enjoin it as a nuisance
310. 54 Am. Jur.2d "Mines and Minerals" § 204 (1992). For a discussion of the
historical understanding of mining as a legitimate business, see generally L.F. SALZMAN,
ENGt1SH INDUSTRIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES 1-83 (1923) (discussing mining as a
legitimate industry in medieval England); T.A. RICKARD, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
MINNG (1932) (discussing development of the mining industry in the United States).
311. 54 Am. Jur.2d § 204 (1992).
312. Id. at § 205; see also Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370
P.2d 342, 345, 353 (Cal. 1962) (holding that dust created by rock and gravel operation
could be a nuisance), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); In re Kelso, 82 P. 241, 242
(Cal. 1905) (holding that blasting may constitute a nuisance).
313. 54 Am. Jur.2d § 205 (1992); see also Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 597 A.2d 219 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (holding water, noise, and air pollution caused
by coal surface mine could be a nuisance), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 861 (Pa. 1992).
314. Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt, 171 N.E.2d 582, 584 (III. 1961); Kane v. Kreiter,
195 N.E.2d 829,832 (Ohio 1963); Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville,
608 A.2d 1377, 1384 (NJ. 1992).
315. 54 Am. Jur.2d § 204 (1992).
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merely because it violates the ordinance. 16 Furthermore, the intensive
state and federal environmental controls, to which surface mines often are
subject does not determine whether a mine is a nuisance but merely one
more factor in the equation.37 The actual determination of whether a
specific surface mining operation can be banned by a zoning ordinance
turns on whether the mine is a public or private nuisance under that state's
law. 31
8
Results will vary from case to case as to when surface mining is
a nuisance, because each case turns on its own facts and there are
variations in state law on what constitutes a nuisance. 3 9 For example,
in McClimans v. Board of Supervisors,320 the court held that the
plaintiffs, whom a zoning ordinance had deprived of all beneficial use of
their minerals, were entitled to compensation even though the proposed
surface mine might adversely affect drinking water, emit toxic blasting
smoke, damage nearby homes, and cause a decline in property values of
adjacent owners.32' But in Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing
Board '3 nearly the same types of negative effects were cited by the
court in affirming the denial of a special exception that would have
permitted the mining company to surface mine coal in an agricultural zone
abutting residential areas. 32 3 These two cases show different results may
occur even within the same state, depending upon the particular court.
E. Summary of Takings Issue
To summarize, first a court must determine if the ordinance is
substantially related to legitimate public interests. The trend is in favor of
finding this relationship when dealing with zoning ordinances that prohibit
or restrict surface mining, especially when unique environmental and
316. Id.; see also Herman v. Village of Hillside, 155 N.E.2d 47, 53 (I11. 1959) (holding
expansion of nonconforming quarry could not be prohibited by zoning ordinance).
317. 54 Am. Jur.2d § 204 (1992).
318. Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992)
(holding that whether development of beachfront lot could be prohibited by land use
regulation turns on whether the use would be a nuisance under South Carolina law).
319. Id. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
320. Supra note 194.
321. Id. at 568-70.
322. 597 A.2d 219 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 861 (Pa. 1992).
323. Id. at 225.
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public safety concerns exist, such as where the mine site adjoins a built-up
area or would cause substantial water pollution." Next, a court must
decide if the property owner has been totally deprived of all beneficial use
of his property. Lucas makes it easier for a property owner to allege such
a deprivation because of its emphasis on investment backed
expectations" and its dictum that the Takings Clause applies to all
property interests recognized by state law, including a separate property
interest in minerals.31 If the property owner retains residual uses, then
he is not deprived of all use. However, Lucas seems to require that these
residual uses have significant economic productivity.'m Finally, even if
the ordinance deprives the owner of all productive use of his property, the
government need not pay compensation if the proposed surface mine
would constitute a nuisance under state common law.32
If a regulatory taking is found under federal constitutional law,
courts have a variety of remedies. 329 The court can invalidate the
ordinance and award compensation for any temporary taking caused by the
regulation,3 ° or the court may allow the ordinance to stand and order the
government to pay compensation for the permanent taking.331
IV. THE LATITUDE OF LUCAS: SOME SUGGESTIONS
If a local government decides to enact an ordinance restricting or
forbidding surface mining, it must exercise caution after the Supreme
Court's decision in Lucas.32 Initially, the locality must determine if it
324. See supra notes 194 to 235 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of
finding a relationship to legitimate public interests).
325. See supra notes 251 to 262 and accompanying text (discussing investment backed
expectations).
326. See supra notes 240 to 250 and accompanying text (discussing takings of just the
mineral estate).
327. See supra notes 263 to 291 and accompanying text (discussing residual uses).
328. See supra notes 302 to 323 and accompanying text (discussing the nuisance
exception).
329. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. CL 2886, 2922 n.6 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 2901 n.17; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
331. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2922 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting); First English, 482 U.S. at
335.
332. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2922 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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has the ability to enact such an ordinance. This means the local
government must ascertain if authority exists under home rule power or
state enabling legislation to enact an ordinance,333 and whether the
ordinance is preempted by federal or state law.3M In addition, the local
government must be sensitive to the possibility of takings challenges.
Takings challenges are avoided by ensuring the ordinance
substantially furthers legitimate public interests. 335 Valid, not arbitrary,
reasons must exist for enacting the ordinance. Examples of legitimate
purposes include prevention of water, air or noise pollution, control of
erosion, and other local environmental problems directly caused by surface
mining23' Legislators can more easily prove that ordinances prohibiting
surface mining near residences, businesses and schools are designed to
protect the public health and safety. Ordinances that forbid mining in
more rural, undeveloped areas are more suspect as being unrelated to valid
police power goals. 37
Next, the local government must decide if it wishes to prohibit
surface mining in certain districts, or everywhere within is boundaries.
Ordinances limiting a property owner from mining on his property are
likely to be challenged as takings. Prior to regulating, a locality should
investigate whether parcels subject to the surface mining prohibition would
have the potential for other economically significant uses. If property
owners are left with the potential for other residential, commercial or
industrial uses, then any takings claim will likely fail. 33' However, if the
zoning scheme is such that the property owner retains only hollow residual
rights, then the validity of the ordinance is questionable after Lucas. For
instance, if the use classification requires the owner to leave his property
in an undeveloped state, then Lucas indicates significant takings concerns
may arise. 39
333. See supra notes 144 to 149 and accompanying text (discussing home rule and land
use enabling legislation).
334. See supra notes 50 to 134 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption issue).
335. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
336. G.M.P. Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 457 A.2d 989, 995 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983).
337. See supra notes 199 to 200 and accompanying text.
338. Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1388 (NJ.
1992).
339. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. CL 2886, 2894-95 (1992); Morris
County Land Imp. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232, 243 (N.J.
1963).
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To accommodate situations where the owner is left with little or no
economically productive use, local governments have several alternatives.
One alternative is to retain limited control by allowing surface mining by
variance or conditional use permit.' Granting of special exceptions or
variances to those few property owners who are left without productive
uses would save the ordinance from invalidity." Another alternative is
to rezone problematic areas so, where topographically possible, the owner
can use the property for other residential, commercial or industrial uses.
Again, variances or conditional use permits can help to accomplish this if
the locality does not wish to make substantial alterations to district
classifications. In these situations, the locality also must avoid the
appearance of spot zoning. Finally, the local government can argue that
allowing surface mining on a particular site would constitute a nuisance
under state law. 2
The most difficult situation local governments may encounter is the
property owner who alleges a taking of only his "mineral estate.""
Lucas further limits the power of local governments by apparently
authorizing such claims." If the ordinance forbids access to a property
owner's mineral estate, then the local government must be prepared to
argue that state law does not recognize a separate estate, or that permitting
surface mining of this mineral would create a nuisance. Otherwise, the
local government may have to allow the mining, perhaps by special
340. Benoit, supra note 5, at 157-58. The difference, of course, between using variances
and conditional use permits is that variances permit the applicant to surface mine even.
though the ordinance forbids it, whereas an ordinance containing conditional or "special"
use permit provisions expressly allows surface mining by permit. MANDELKER, supra
note 145, at § 6.35. Variances are harder to obtain because the applicant must overcome
a higher burden of proof; in contrast, a zoning board's discretion to deny a special
exception is much more narrow. Id. at § 6.53. Permitting surface mining only by
variance would therefore grant the municipality greater autonomy over the location of
mining.
341. Benoit, supra note 5, at 157-58; see also 1991 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 31, 34 (noting
that special exception provisions in the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act save it from
takings challenges).
342. See supra notes 302 to 323 and accompanying text (discussing the nuisance
exception to takings jurisprudence). For other suggestions on how local governments can
safely regulate mining, see generally Paul J. Schlauch, Tripartite Federalism -- The
Emerging Role of Local Government as a Regulator of the Extractive Industries, 20
ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INsT. 359 (1974).
343. See supra notes 240 to 250 and accompanying text.
344. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. C. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
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exception or variance, or pay just compensation.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council obviously burdens the
ability of local governments to combat the problems of surface mining,
especially because of the investment backed expectations and occasional
lack of significant alternative uses present when surface mining is
involved. In the words of Justice Stevens, Lucas may "greatly hamper the
efforts of local officials and planners who must deal with increasingly
complex problems in land-use and environmental regulation."' 5
However, many of the health, safety and environmental problems with
which these ordinances are designed to deal should fall within Lucas'
nuisance exception.' Surely a surface mine that spews out toxic gases,
pollutes drinking water supplies, or destroys the peace and solitude of
nearby homes and schools constitutes a nuisance.1 7 Therefore, although
Lucas hinders local governments, its latitude may not be as wide as some
fear.
V. CONCLUSION
Local governments desiring to enact ordinances restricting surface
mining have a number of issues with which to concern themselves. First,
they must consult federal and state law to determine whether the locality
is preempted from enacting such an ordinance. Surface mining of coal is
regulated at the state and federal le'vel by the Surface Mining Control and
345. Id. at 2922 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens continued:
As this case -- in which the claims of an individual property owner
exceed $1 million -- well demonstrates, these officials face both
substantial uncertainty because the ad hoc nature of takings law and
unacceptable penalties if they guess incorrectly about that law.
Id. (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted).
346. See, e.g., Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377,
1384-86 (N.J. 1992) (using Lucas' nuisance exception in upholding ordinance effectively
prohibiting rock quarrying).
347. Cf. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962) (upholding
ordinance that halted rock quarrying because the quarry posed a substantial danger to
adjacent homes and schools); G.M.P. Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 457 A.2d 989,
995 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (upholding zoning ordinance banning surface mining where
such mining would cause erosion, water pollution, contamination of drinking water, and
a decrease in property values).
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Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).348 Nothing in the federal SMCRA
indicates localities are preempted from controlling the initial location of
surface mining through zoning, nor is there any indication that ordinances
more stringent than federal standards would be impermissible. If the state
has opted to obtain jurisdiction by enacting its own SMCRA, then the text
of the state statute may control the issue; a few states preempt local
governments from regulating surface mining, but most do not. If the
zoning ordinance will be applied to federally owned lands, the locality is
limited to ordinances that don't conflict with federal laws, and do not
prohibit mining on federal lands.
Next, the local government must decide if enabling legislation or
home rule powers authorize it to pass an ordinance, and whether the
ordinance might be challenged as a taking. To avoid takings challenges,
the ordinance must substantially relate to legitimate public interests, such
as safety or protection of the environment. If the ordinance would deprive
a property owner of all productive use of his property interest, then local
governments have a number of other considerations. The Supreme Court's
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 9 poses some
limitations on what local governments can do to control the problems of
surface mining through zoning.
348. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
349. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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